The 2nd NVA Division was also an elusive enemy. The valley’s patchwork of rice paddies and wooded islands had served the division as a primary source of rice and recruits, while the surrounding hills and forests harbored the division’s rest camps, logistical support areas and training sites. The 2nd NVA Division had made the Que Son Valley and surrounding hills its second home when it arrived from North Vietnam in February 1966. The 3rd NVA Regiment was a first-rate outfit whose soldiers had a reputation of being tough and resolute. While Dorland had confidence in his men, he also knew that the enemy he faced were not garden-variety Viet Cong armed with cast-off French or American rifles of World War II vintage. As backup, the brigade had alerted Company B, 2/1, and Company B, 3/21, to be prepared for an air assault into 4/31’s area of operation. Artillery fire support would be provided by Battery B, 3/82, and Battery C, 3/16, located on Fire Support Base Center seven kilometers to the south. Two platoons of armored personnel carriers (APCs) from F Troop, 17th Cavalry, provided Dorland mobility and quick reaction, and four tanks from A Troop, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, supplied the force a mighty punch. The two rifle companies formed the core of the task force. ![]() Companies B and D, 4/31, were commanded by two solid soldiers, Captains James Bierschmidt and Dan Mellon. Task Force Dorland was indeed a powerful and well-led force. Dorland had joined the 4/31 less than a month before the 196th LIB deployed into the Que Son Valley.ĭorland felt certain of his abilities to do the job most important, he had total confidence that his men were prepared to meet any challenge. Dorland was no stranger to the war in Vietnam, having completed a tour of duty as an adviser to the South Vietnamese Army a year before the first American combat troops arrived in-country. Dorland had graduated from West Point, class of 1959, and attended the Airborne Ranger courses at Fort Benning, Ga., before joining the 20th Infantry in the Panama Canal Zone. However, in this case, brigade noted that they had intercepted a radio transmission from the vicinity of Hill 63, which gave the target more immediacy than normal.Īt 29, Gil Dorland had all of the necessary credentials to command a unit in combat. Many intelligence reports turned out to be inaccurate or old, he said. Dorland’s task force was quickly tagged to check the validity of the report, and he remembers getting the message late that afternoon. Dorland.Īs luck would have it - some might call it destiny - Task Force Dorland was conducting search operations only a few kilometers east of Hill 63 when the intelligence report arrived at the brigade TOC. ![]() The two remaining companies were assigned as a part of an armor-infantry task force commanded by the battalion operations officer, Major Gilbert N. Company A secured the battalion’s new fire support base (FSB) at the Que Son Valley’s western edge, and Company C secured the brigade headquarters at Hill 35, near National Route 1. The 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry (4/31), one of the three infantry battalions assigned to the 196th LIB, was operating in a split mode. Colonel Louis Gelling had deployed the Chargers into the valley from Chu Lai a few days before to replace the 1st Brigade, 101st (Airborne) Division. Hill 63 sits in the valley’s center, but its numerical designation was as yet unfamiliar to members of the brigade. It was the day before Thanksgiving 1967, and the place was the fertile Que Son Valley, some 40 kilometers southwest of Da Nang. ‘Units of the 3rd Regiment, 2nd North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division dug in near Hill 63, summarized the flash message into the tactical operations center (TOC) of the 196th Light Infantry Brigade (LIB) Chargers. Task Force Dorland at Hill 63 During the Vietnam War Close
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